An attacker would be unable to do this unless they had physical access to the original camera.īut it'll be at least 3 decades before this technology is commercialized, people see the demand for it, and the majority of all cameras in the world are replaced by it.Įven if this new tech is on the market in a decade (simple tech, no demand / ecosystem yet), but 90% of existing / installed cameras don't have the feature then fake videos still get created with them. In order to change any pixels in the video you'd break this key and need to resign it.
Ie every frame in a video is signed with a 512-bit key that states authoritatively what camera was the source of the video and when it was taken. > What do you mean "authentication technology"?Ĭryptographic signatures. What do we do at that point? Do smartphone videos get automatically hashed and uploaded to a blockchain somewhere, so that we can prove when the video came into being? Do we return to an 1850s sense of news, where claims effectively cease to be falsifiable except via personal experience? Are we ready for any of this? It appears that within the next ~20 years we'll lose that reliability - footage of a politician making a dirty deal or a businessman engaging in conspiracy will become deniable not just as a misleading edit, but as outright fabrication. It does touch on an interesting point, though: we've had roughly 100 years in which photo and audio recreations of events constitute "hard evidence" beyond our ability to fully falsify. The surrealism of seeing a fake recreation of oneself might have some impact, but we handled ultra-realistic paintings alright. The first time a Senator gets "exposed" for some misdeed but proves the evidence is fake, "there's a photo of this" loses its punch. I mean, there's presumably a very short window for that before photo evidence becomes unconvincing to people.
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